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Cu r r en t  A f f a i r s
In rhetorical terms, relations between the two sides of theTaiwan Strait have entered an uncharted phase with thereformulation by President Ma Ying-jeou of the nature of
these relations. On 26 August 2008, in an interview with
the daily Sol de Mexico, Ma said, “Relations between the
two sides cannot be qualified as state-to-state relations. It is
a special relationship between a free region and a mainland
region but not between two countries.” The president sought
to justify his statement by citing the Constitution of the Re-
public of China, which as he interprets it does not allow the
existence of another country on its territory. (1) This marks a
major rupture with the two-state theory enunciated in July
1999 by then president Lee Teng-hui. By characterising the
cross-strait exchange as “special state-to-state  relations”
(teshu de guoyuguo de guanxi), Lee had provoked major
tensions, and China reacted by suspending the informal dia-
logue between the two sides. Now the government has bro-
ken unambiguously with the policy of Chen Shui-bian, who
declared in August 2002 that there was a state on each side
of the strait (yibian, yiguo). Ma’s statement, which set off no
ripples except among the opposition ranks, amounted to a re-
turn to the situation that prevailed until the late 1990s.
The lead article in the pro-independence weekly Xin Tai-
wan Xinwen Zhoukan said that Ma’s stand amounted to a
vassalisation and “desovereignisation” (qu Taiwan zhuquan)
of the island. The mention of two “regions” as well as the
“special relations” that entailed meant the denial of the right
to sovereignty of 23 million Taiwanese people, an asymmet-
ric concession made with no reciprocal gesture by the Peo-
ple’s Republic, the author said, citing a recent letter by Chi-
nese ambassador to the United Nations, Wang Guangya, re-
minding member states of the one-China principle. (2)
Attacking the rhetorical dimension of this reformulation, the
author dismisses the argument that the RoC constitution
precludes another state on its territory. He says it is based
on a political decision equivalent to the one taken by Chiang
Kai-shek in 1971 when he rejected the principle of double
representation for China in the United Nations. Today, only
the Chinese threat helps feed the fiction that legal obstacles
disallow mutual recognition.
In the interview, Ma stressed the need to set aside disputes
over sovereignty. He recalled that the 1992 consensus was
meant to serve as the basis for conducting cross-strait rela-
tions until the issue was finally resolved. But the author of
the article says the 1992 formula (one China, but different
interpretations of it, yizhong gebiao) has never existed out-
side Taiwan. It was invented by the Kuomintang member of
Parliament Su Chi, who now heads Taiwan’s National Se-
curity Council. Beijing swears by the One-China princi-
ple. (3) Adhering to the 1992 consensus and describing Tai-
wan as a “region” (diqu) negates the island’s sovereignty
and is a manifestation, the author says, of a gradual slide to-
1. The Chinese government covers a mere 18% and insurance accounts for 30%. Study
published in The Lancet, “Health System Reform in China,” Vol. 372, Issue 9648, Octo-
ber 2008.
2. According to Ministry of Health figures published in the national media: see for exam-














Analysis by Hubert Kilian based on: 
• Wang Shan, “Ma Ying-jeou and the non-state theory: Taiwan or China’s puppet,” Xin Taiwan Xinwen Zhoukan, n° 651, 11
September 2008.
• Hsueh Hua-yuan, “Ridiculous non-state theory,” Xin Taiwan Xinwen Zhoukan, n° 651, 11 September 2008.
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wards unification with the mainland (huadu jiantong).
The author of the second article says the re-characterisation
of cross-strait ties has to be anchored in a strictly Taiwanese
historical perspective, to better position Taiwan with regard
to the RoC constitution, and to definitively remove the
threat of civil war. But given the absence of consensus on the
issue of national identity, Ma has rendered this dimension
murky. The president has limited himself to relations be-
tween the RoC and the PRC. The author says the problems
goes back to the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 8 Septem-
ber 1951 between Japan and the United States, (4) which
failed to clearly set out Taiwan’s status, following the prece-
dent of the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Dec-
laration of 1945, (5) which failed to sufficiently clarify ele-
ments setting out that Taiwan belonged to the RoC in inter-
national law. Elaborating the classical pro-independence
legal arguments, the author says it is wrong to redefine cross-
strait ties in light of current tactical exigencies alone. 
Facing attacks by Lee, who was furious at seeing his grand
contribution to the construction of a purely Taiwanese nation
state thus denigrated, (6) Ma said in a press statement (7) that
the concept of region had first been suggested by Lee him-
self in the Guidelines for National Unification in 1991, in
which the two sides of the strait were deemed “political en-
tities.” Moreover, Ma stressed the need to overcome the sov-
ereignty dispute.
Drawing up a balance sheet on the first 100 days of Ma’s
presidency, the two authors voiced disquiet over the indiffer-
ence that greeted the re-characterisation, pointing to what
they saw as three failures by Ma (sanxiu). The first was
diplomatic, with the foreign policy strategy based on “diplo-
matic truce” (waijiao xiubing), the second was economic,
with the desire to overhaul the insular economic policy by
seeking closer links to the mainland (jingji xiushi), and the
third was on sovereignty (zhuquan xiuke), as the re-charac-
terisation showed. The authors say this tendency has already
rattled Japan and the United States.•
• Translated by N. Jayaram
For the European Union, any conclusion of a Co-operation and Partnership Agreement (CPA) isconditional upon the inclusion of a human rights
clause in the final draft. The commission has made it
clear that every new foreign agreement with countries
outside the EU must link the further development of
economic and commercial relations to a respect for
human rights. The relevant clause allows the EU to sus-
pend the preferential treatment granted to its partners in
the event of a blatant human rights violation. (8) So far,
the differences between the two sides on the matter of
human rights have delayed the signing of a CPA. While
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3. “Wen: China’s Health Care Reform Focuses on Public Service,” Xinhua, 15 April 2008. 
4. “Shouzhi liang tiaoxian”: Separating hospital accounting between revenue generated
from treatments and drugs on the one hand and expenditures on the other, in order to
prevent medical establishments from making money through the sale of drugs.
5. As opposed to “guanban heyi,” meaning management and direction of health establish-
ments belong to just one structure in which the person in charge of the health department
is also the hospital director. The guanban fenli principle suggests that the two are sepa-
rate. 
6. “Lee Teng-hui pans Ma over belief in ‘1992 consensus,’” Taipei Times, 26 October 2008.
7. “Ma vows to listen to ‘voice of the people,’” Taipei Times, 27 October 2008. 
8. "This commitment to human rights and a legal framework are reflected in the Union's com-
mon foreign and security policy provisions and in its development cooperation programme.
Every new agreement between the EU and a third country includes a human rights clause
allowing for trade benefits and development cooperation to be suspended if abuses are












The Human Rights Clause in
China-Europe Negotiations
Analysis by Mathieu Duchâtel based on: 
• Zhang Hua, "The problem of the clause on human rights and the Sino-European agreement on cooperation," Xiandai Guoji
Guanxi, No. 8, August 2008, pp. 40-47.
the negotiations on this new framework agreement to re-
place the 1985 agreement on economic and commercial
cooperation began in early 2007 (9) and are still ongoing,
it appears that China is prepared to relax its opposition
to the human rights clause. This article by Zhang Hua (10)
calls on the Chinese government to accept the clause,
but with reservations intended to limit its range and to re-
strict the EU’s ability to force China to make major
changes in civil rights legislation.
The human rights clause is a crucial point in the Sino-
European negotiations. Zhang Hua sees in it a potential
source of contention between China and the EU that
overshadows the embargo on arms sales, the question of
granting China the status of market economy, the Euro-
pean trade deficit, or the problem of illegal Chinese im-
migration. Zhang Hua goes back over the history of the
emergence of this clause in European diplomacy, but
there is no need to rehash it all here. (11) He emphasises
that this clause is fundamental to the EU’s foreign pol-
icy. It has been added to more than 50 agreements of
every type signed with more than 120 partners. More-
over, although it is not currently applied to agreements
covering particular sectors, such as textiles or agricultural
products for example, in the future it may well become a
condition for signing such agreements as well.
Yet the EU’s human rights diplomacy cannot be com-
pared to the brutal methods of the Americans (such as
military interventions or embargoes). The inclusion of a
human rights clause in bilateral agreements is far more ac-
ceptable to developing countries. Zhang Hua points out
that the EU does not employ double standards in its deal-
ings with developing and developed countries. In 1997,
negotiations between Europe and Australia for signing a
cooperation and partnership agreement were blocked by
Canberra’s refusal to sign a text including a human rights
clause, and the two sides had to be satisfied with issuing
a joint communiqué. The EU negotiations with New
Zealand encountered the same roadblock in 1999. In the
case of any failure to respect the terms of the human
rights clause, the EU reserves the right to suspend the
implementation of the agreements. For example, this was
the case with Belarus in 2001, and Zimbabwe in 2002.
The EU also employs a number of positive incentives to
encourage respect for human rights among its partners. In
Zhang Hua’s view, they are more effective in promoting
respect for human rights than sanctions.
Unlike unilateral sanctions, the human rights clause is
consistent with the rules of international law. It respects
the principle of the freedom of treaties, and in this re-
gard it constitutes an attempt to promote human rights
through consensus. This means that it avoids all interfer-
ence in the internal affairs of other States, since these
third parties agree voluntarily to link the human rights
situation in their country to a partnership with the EU.
In this sense, Zhang Hua believes that the acceptance of
the human rights clause by such third parties is a mani-
festation of the EU’s soft power, which has enabled the
European Union to forge its own identity within the in-
ternational system. 
Zhang Hua considers the dialogue between China and
Europe on human rights to be well established. There
are many exchanges between the two parties in this key
policy area. In 1996, alongside the dialogue within the
EU-China summit meetings, the various bilateral policy
discussions, and ASEM and the Security Council, the
two sides initiated exchanges specifically concerned with
human rights. Through the European agencies for
democracy and human rights, the EU supports NGOs
and civil society, as well as individuals in China who up-
hold the cause of human rights. In his view, the EU is
already having an influence on the development of
human rights protection in China.
Yet Zhang Hua acknowledges that there is still frustra-
tion in Europe over the amount of real progress over
human rights in China, despite increasingly diverse bilat-
eral channels of communication. That explains why, at
the 10th EU-China summit in November 2007, the EU
called for more substantial cooperation between the two
parties on this issue, to which China agreed.
When discussions on the CPA were initiated in early
2007, the two sides faced a clear obstacle to the progress
of their bilateral relations. On the one hand, the increas-
ing volume of their joint activities and shared projects,
and the importance of their mutual trade, provided suffi-
cient grounds for re-assessing and upgrading (shengji)
their bilateral relations. On the other hand, Beijing
tended to see the human rights clause as interference in
China’s internal affairs, while for the EU it was a sine
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9. The decision to open negotiations on a partnership and cooperation agreement was
taken at the Helsinki summit. See paragraph 4 of the Joint Statement of the Ninth EU-
China Summit, 9 September 2006.
10. Zhang Hua is a high-ranking member of the Chinese administration who holds a doc-
torate in international law at the University of Wuhan and specialises in EU law.
11. Readers interested in this issue can consult the following expert report: Vaughne Miller,
The Human Rights Clause in the EU's External Agreements, research paper 4/33, House












qua non condition. There could be no question of aban-
doning it to enable the CPA to be signed. In view of
this, Zhang Hua believes that any attempt to convince
the EU by reasoning that it was futile to try to get China
to agree to the human rights clause, and by pointing to
Europe’s own interests, was a lost cause right from the
start. His argument suggests that China opted for con-
cessions when it perceived the Europeans’ determined
stance on the issue.
But accepting the human rights clause carries obvious
legal risks for China. A CPA is a global agreement.
Whereas until now the two sides in the negotiations have
separated political issues from economic and commercial
ones, the CPA ties them together. So the European Par-
liament, or those member states that strongly support
human rights, may seize upon this agreement to demand
that the EU should extract more concessions on human
rights from China.
Zhang Hua calls for the human rights clause to be ac-
cepted with reservations (you xiandu di jieshou). There
are many potential benefits for China in a CPA with a
human rights clause attached. To sign it only amounts to
institutionalising an already existing dialogue surround-
ing the question of human rights. Firstly, therefore, it
does not represent a new departure, and since China has
to demonstrate its political willingness to the EU, a good
means would be to take the existing dialogue further.
Secondly, there are the many benefits arising from
China’s acceptance of the clause, for the EU gives
greater weight to rewarding its signatories than to punish-
ing those who fail to respect it.
In addition to this, the author shows that the Europeans
will have very limited room for manoeuvre in seeking to
impose sanctions on China in the event of non-compli-
ance with the clause. Historically, the EU has only ap-
plied sanctions to ACP states (Africa, the Caribbean,
and the Pacific). In most cases these sanctions were im-
posed in response to UN Security Council resolutions.
Moreover, whenever differences arise over human rights,
the EU regularly favours political dialogue. Its approach
to the promotion of human rights and democracy in
China consists of encouraging progress in that area. Ex-
perience shows that before undertaking a sanctions pol-
icy, the EU always takes a prudent and well thought-out
position. Since this process of considering sanctions is
taken through consultations with all the European insti-
tutions and member states, the risk of sanctions is very
low. Although Zhang Hua acknowledges that the situa-
tion in Europe is changing, he concludes that in the
short term China is immune from any sanctions.
He also underlines the point that the human rights
clause is a bilateral legal instrument. So he believes that
China could make use of it at any time to denounce the
human rights situation in Europe, even though that
would have no precedent in the history of relations be-
tween the EU and another signatory State. The clause
is a legal weapon insofar as the situation concerning the
protection of immigrant and minority rights remains a
problem in Europe. This argument concerning reciproc-
ity was used by the EU to persuade Mexico to sign a
partnership and cooperation agreement in 1997. It seems
highly likely that the EU will make use of the clause as
the legal basis for a very flexible partnership with China,
giving priority to incentives and rewards.
In exchange for its agreement to sign, China could de-
mand concessions in other policy areas, such as the em-
bargo on arms sales or being granted the status of a mar-
ket economy. It could also exercise better control over
the EU’s pressures on it with regard to the imbalance in
Sino-European trade. If it shows flexibility in its diplo-
macy and willingness to address human rights, China
could strengthen its own soft power, and avoid arousing
misunderstandings and doubts in the West about its
choice of the path of peaceful development.
Admittedly, the human rights clause will intensify
China’s “legal burden” (falü fudan). But it could put a
limit on such pressures, and that is how acceptance “with
reservations” should be understood. China should focus
on refusing the inclusion in the final draft of any refer-
ence to international agreements that it has not yet
signed. That is particularly true in the case of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
China signed in 1998 but has not yet ratified. Any men-
tion of that pact would commit China to major changes
in its legal provisions. The same consideration applies to
any mention of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Mentioning these two documents would give the
Europeans a lever (shouren yibing) to put pressure on
China. In Zhang Hua’s view, Beijing should limit itself
to the usual references to democracy, the rule of law, and
human rights, mentioning only documents that it has al-
ready signed, the five principles of peaceful coexistence,
and the broad principles of the United Nations Charter.
At the procedural level, China must insist on the inclu-
sion of a point similar to Article 96 of the Cotonou
Agreement, which provides for lengthy bilateral consul-
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tations if either party should fail to meet its obligations,
and sets out the principle that sanctions should be pro-
portionate to the infraction concerned. The Chinese ne-
gotiating team must also get the Europeans to agree to
arbitration procedures. Finally, Zhang Hua argues that it
is important for a public statement to be issued, setting
out the precise points of agreement and difference be-
tween the two sides, emphasising that incentives are
preferable to sanctions, and that cooperation on human
rights must be gradually upgraded, starting from the pres-
ent level. For China, the human rights clause could thus
be transformed into a declaration of goodwill.•
• Translated by Jonathan Hall













you xiandu di jieshou 有限度地接受
falü fudan 法律負擔
shouren yibing 授人一柄
teshu de guoyuguo de guanxi 特殊的國與國的關係 
yibian, yiguo 一邊一國 
qu Taiwan zhuquan 去台灣主權




waijiao xiubing 外交休兵 
jingji xiushi 經濟休市
zhuquan xiuke 主權休克
